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Abstract
Set against a backdrop of widespread democratization in Latin America, the foundation
of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) in 1991 represents an effort to both harmonize
interstate relations and enhance the region’s collective standing on the global stage. This work
takes particular interest with the principles of democracy protection enshrined within the 1998
Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment. Stable democratic function is often viewed as an
end unto itself, and can also promote economic and macropolitical stability within a framework
of strong regional interdependence. This work will provide a literature review which merges
scholarly insights on the role of hegemonic interests, existing liberal norms, ideological
movements, and more in democracy protection initiatives. It is found that Mercosur and other
regional organizations may operate most decisively to enforce democracy clauses when doing so
aligns with the strategic interests of the regional hegemon. In the absence of specific guidelines
for enforcement, democracy protection is also heavily influenced by the emergence of
transnational ideological movements, as is the case with South America’s ‘New Left.’ Stronger
standards of basic constitutional function would lend more credibility to Mercosur’s democracy
clause, and possible provide for more effective tutelage of democratic norms throughout the
continent.
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Introduction
South America in the late twentieth century was a region marked by profound transitions.
Several states within the continent were embarking on a transition from military dictatorship to
electoral democracy during this period. Argentina did so in 1983, followed by Brazil and
Uruguay in 1985 and Paraguay in 1989. The years of dictatorship produced countless
controversies in the field of human rights. Questions persist to the present regarding such issues
as the summary detention of activists, enforced disappearances, and even an apparent nuclear
arms race between Argentina and Brazil. Public records such as the Disappeared Project
webpage stand as testaments to these violations, emphasizing that the pursuit of justice and truth
has not ceased.1 With the return of democracy came the desire to strengthen it to any extent
possible, thereby eliminating the conditions which allow autocratic regimes to seize power.
The Mercosur - abbreviated from Mercado Común del Sur (‘Southern Common Market’)
- is a free trade zone and customs union comprising the four aforementioned states. The chief
function of Mercosur is to promote economic development and cooperation, with one of its goals
being to enhance the economic competitiveness of the Southern Cone nations in a globalizing
world. But the greater context in which the Mercosur is situated cannot be ignored, with a
decrease in military tensions and competition also being noted. 2 The success of Mercosur lies in
the development of a shared political and economic interest, and its ability to provide a forum
through which its member states may deliberately discuss this interest. This process may remind
some of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, an organization formed
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in the 1950s to promote European cooperation in the aftermath of the Second World War. This
would form an important precursor to the modern-day institutions of the European Union.
This work explores the following question: under what conditions might Mercosur
respond when democracy is under threat in a member state? This study will include the four
states mentioned above - Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay - as well as Venezuela, a full
member which acceded after the bloc’s foundation but has been suspended since 2016. It will
analyze the response of Mercosur to specific instances of democratic crisis among its member
states since its inception in 1991. The response of the Mercosur will be evaluated in the context
of the following historical cases: the attempted coup against President Wasmosy of Paraguay in
1996; the Argentine economic crisis of 2001; the impeachment of Paraguayan president
Fernando Lugo in 2012; the tenure of Venezuela as a member between 2013 and 2016,
culminating in its suspension; and the impeachment of President Rousseff in Brazil in 2016.
The value of this work lies in its examination of regional organizations as a tool for
cooperative development among the nations of the Global South. Much attention has been paid
in the international politics literature to the role of the United States, a global power wielding
significant advantages in many different respects, in guiding inter-American policy. Mercosur, as
with other attempts at integration within South America, necessarily shifts the focus away from
this rather U.S.-centric worldview. With its various internal processes and external agreements,
Mercosur represents one instance of developing states pursuing political and economic relations
on their own terms rather than under hegemonic influence. In addition, strong democratic
institutions and traditions are viewed by some as significant promoters of economic
development3. This is to say nothing of popular conceptions of democracy as a noble goal in and
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of itself. To this end, the ability of South American states to create and maintain an institution
which guarantees democratic stability lends vital legitimacy, both to said institution and to those
states as institutional partners.
The importance of this work is also underscored by the continued patterns of economic
interdependence between many neighboring countries. Globalization is a continuing trend,
bridging the gaps between far-away peoples in many different respects. According to World
Bank data, Brazil’s two largest import and export partners are China and the United States,
reflecting a current global polarity of sorts.4 But Argentina, Brazil’s largest neighbor in terms of
economic output, sits at third. Likewise, Brazil is Argentina’s biggest trade partner. Brazil,
Argentina, and Chile are the biggest trade partners of Paraguay. Commercial interdependence is
also marked by migration patterns. The International Office for Migration (IOM) notes that the
South American migration is increasingly intra-regional in recent years, many more and more
people are moving to other parts of the continent rather than elsewhere in the world. 5 The
‘Southern Cone’ nations of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile draw many of these migrants.
Furthermore, the IOM estimates that more than 6 million people have left Venezuela since the
beginning of its political crisis, with most settling in other South American states. The political
and economic factors which drive intra-regional migration make it necessary for national leaders
to consider how they can enhance the stability of the region as a whole, rather than just that of
their own immediate constituency. To reiterate: Mercosur is taken as a compelling subject of
academic research due to shared national contexts of authoritarianism and subsequent
democratization; Mercosur facilitates migration, trade, and economic cooperation between its
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members; and democracy protection is one avenue by which its members can achieve greater
regional stability and harmony.
The question posed by this work will be examined in several stages. The first section will
establish the theoretical frameworks through which Mercosur’s crisis response policies may be
understood. In this section, international relations theories will be used to synthesize a number of
testable hypotheses regarding Mercosur’s response to democratic crises. The second section
outlines the methodologies of the study.

Literature Review: Theories & Hypotheses
The various explanations for why and how Mercosur might respond to an internal crisis
may be informed by international relations theory, particularly realist, normative, and domesticpolitical paradigms. This review will also discuss specific case studies from the history of
Mercosur and other regional organizations within the Western hemisphere.
Realism. The first theory of interest, and the one requiring the most attention because of
its vast influence on the study of foreign politics, is realism. This theory holds that states are the
primary agents of international politics, and that their actions toward other states are dictated in
large part by the overall balance of power. Noted realist scholar John J. Mearsheimer has used a
number of rhetorical devices to describe a realist system, writing in one review that it “paints a
rather grim picture” of the world as a “brutal arena” for self-interested states. 6 The central
assumptions of realist theory, as given by Mearsheimer, are as follows: that the global political
order is anarchical in the sense that states are the primary actors, with no binding authority above
them; that the strength of a state can be measured in terms of “offensive military capability,”
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allowing them to potentially inflict harm upon others; that one state cannot know another state’s
intentions with absolute certainty; that states act in the interest of survival, which Mearsheimer
conflates with sovereignty; and that states act strategically in order to provide for their survival
given all of the above.7
Realism is often juxtaposed with the theory of liberalism. While the former upholds states
as the primary actors of the global system, the latter recognizes the role of subnational and
institutional forces in guiding state policy. Andrew Moravcsik stresses the importance of
acknowledging “the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in
which they are embedded.”8 Of course, realist theory itself is hardly consolidated under the
premises described above, and certain varieties of realist theory have come about to address
perceived challenges to its assumptions. For instance, the modern world has seen an increase in
states’ abilities to utilize information and modern digital technology in place of more traditional
military implements. Contemporary analysis therefore calls into question the applicability of
classical measures of state power. Simply put, strength exists in many forms.
What is important in the context of this work is the idea that states exist in a rough
hierarchy, even when an international institution has been created to allow for collective action.
When placed amongst a group of like-minded peers, some states may command more or less
influence over decision making processes. This is based on a variety of factors, including
military, economic, and cultural. Furthermore, even as an international organization such as
Mercosur claims to adopt its own rules and aims, the collective action carried out by that
organization may often be bounded by the willingness of the more powerful member states to
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endorse it. This ultimately falls back on the fundamental realist tenets of state capabilities and
self-interest.
This work will therefore consider how closely the actions of Mercosur, as an international
organization, align with the interests of its more powerful members. Much research has been
devoted to the role of the United States as a dominant power within the Organization of
American States (OAS), and to what extent this hegemonic position plays a role in how the
organization responds to crises.9 It is true that the OAS is a multilateral organization with its own
rules and norms which it seeks to enforce. However, references exist throughout the literature to
the U.S. as a hegemon of sorts within the hemisphere, and their capabilities remain key in
determining the when, how, and why of crisis intervention.
This work on Mercosur necessarily excludes the role of the United States, and instead
focuses on the balance of power amongst its own more limited membership. Mercosur began as
an economic association aggregating the interests of some larger states (Argentina, Brazil) with
those of some smaller neighbors (Uruguay, Paraguay). This makes for an interesting power
dynamic in itself. Perhaps more significant, however, is the rise of Brazil as a regional power in
recent years. The regional balance of power has shifted such that “other Latin American
countries and most international partners see Brazil as the natural leader of the region, in terms
of both political stability and economic growth.” 10 The role of realist power dynamics, as they
relate to Mercosur’s response to crisis, will be evaluated through the following hypothesis:

𝐻1 : Mercosur’s response to democratic crises depends on the interests and preferences of the
regional hegemon, Brazil.
9
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Normativism. Normative theory recognizes a variety of actors within the international
order, whether they be states, subnational groups, or international organizations. In contrast with
realism, a normativist would argue that the main determinant of state conduct is not the
distribution of power nor the configuration of capabilities, but rather the adoption, diffusion, and
crystallization of shared norms or ideals. Jeffrey Checkel actually labels states as the principal
agents of the international system, as a realist would, but proposes that norms impose significant
restraints on their actions.11 He places the role of norms within the greater theory of
constructivism, with which he is commonly associated. The constructivist school holds that
many of the assumptions made by international relations scholars should be based on paradigms
which are built through historical and social processes, rather than taken for granted based on
conceptions of base human nature. Although many works explicitly conflate normativism and
constructivism, as Checkel does, the former term will continue to be used for the purposes of this
work. This better reflects the formation and consolidation of norms as a specific process within
regional organizations, providing guidelines or aspirations for their behavior.
The formation of norms is a process which some describe as granting a degree of agency
to an organization, making it something more than a simple instrument of state power. Oelsner,
whose research deals in part with Mercosur specifically, refers heavily to the internal “identity”
of an international organization.12 The legitimacy of an organization initially comes from the will
of the states which decide to form it. But a regional organization which is embedded with strong
norms, arising from the aggregation of ideals held by the communities and states within, may
reflect upon its members and influence their actions. Within regional and other international
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institutions, Carlos Closa and Stefano Palestini see opportunities for “tutelage” among member
states. Some states see themselves as promoters of positive democratic norms, and enhancing
their relationships with their partners through integration will help to consolidate those norms. 13
Some references exist in international relations literature to cases in which states pursue
institutional intervention, even when their capabilities permit them to act according to what
might be considered a more integral national interest. To return briefly to the example of the
OAS, Boniface refers to an instance in which the United States sought sanctions against Peru due
to the actions of then-president Alberto Fujimori in 1992.14 Fujimori had dissolved the national
Congress in pursuit of expanded executive power. The OAS acted almost immediately to
condemn this self-coup, and the U.S. in particular pushed for a suspension of economic aid and
loans worth several billions of dollars. Boniface sees the actions of the U.S. as a move which
would run counter to what might be predicted under a realist paradigm. He identifies Fujimori as
a stalwart ally in the fight against drug trafficking and far-left terrorism within the hemisphere.
To possibly endanger national security priorities to lend credence to regional crisis intervention
shows how a state can be motivated equally, if not above all else, by their normative concern for
democratic principles.
This work will continue to explore the contributions of normativism with respect to the
members of Mercosur. It will weigh the principles espoused in key organizational documents,
particularly the Ushuaia Protocol which recognizes the proper functioning of democratic
institutions as “an essential condition for the development of the processes of integration.” 15 This
theoretical approach is summarized in the following hypothesis:
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𝐻2 : Mercosur’s response to democratic crises depends on the level of commitment to democratic
norms within the region.
Domestic Politics. Domestic-political theory may be somewhat related to liberalism, but
offers a little more specificity in the sense that it focuses on the role of national interests. The
member states of Mercosur being democracies implies that the leaders of those states represent
domestic constituencies, upon which they rely as providers of both policy preferences and job
security. Political scientist Robert Putnam famously conceived of state politics as a “two-level
game,” in which the art of international diplomacy must be balanced with the maintenance of
electoral coalitions at home.16 He dispenses with the notion that states are unitary actors in
themselves. State actors are influenced in their decision making by both constituents in the
domestic sphere and counterparts in other states. Crucially, he suggests that the approval of the
former is essentially a prerequisite for cooperation with the latter.
Based on Putnam’s logic, it follows that a head of state or government might be
recalcitrant to pursue intervention overseas if such an action would prove unpopular on the home
front. This may conflict with the provisions of normative theory if the prevailing domestic
interests at a particular moment in time contradict what might be predicted based on existing
ideals. In her analysis of the OAS, Betsy Smith provides commentary on the role that political
ideology may play in crisis response.17 She places her work in the context of the emergence of
the “new Left” since the 1990s. Leaders such as Néstor Kirchner in Argentina or Hugo Chávez
in Venezuela have been viewed as forming a sort of ‘club’ in their own way. Bound by the
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perceived threat of right-wing opponents and U.S.-led interventions, Smith suggests that
members of the Latin American Left will not act against their counterparts in another nation for
fear of weakening the political platform on which they themselves stand. Smith’s work provides
some poignant questions which might also be relevant in the case of Mercosur. Given the role of
leftist leaders just among Mercosur members, is there evidence of this sort of transnational
political solidarity presenting itself in the organization’s crisis response? Must the domesticallyoriented force of ideological affiliation be at odds with institutional norms and operating
procedures? These are summarized by the following hypothesis:

𝐻3 : Mercosur’s response to democratic crises depends on the configuration of political
ideologies amongst its member states.
Another hypothesis will be weighed which deals more specifically with the nature of the
crisis, rather than regional power implications or institutional factors. Smith examines the
response of the OAS to a wide variety of historical crises, considering both the origin of each
crisis and its severity.18 She and Stefano Palestini both lend some credence to the idea that a
threat against a democratically-elected incumbent is more likely to be met by a decisive
institutional response, as opposed to a threat precipitated by an incumbent. 19 For Smith, the
concept of “executive sovereignty” explains why state leaders may be unwilling to sanction their
counterparts for all except the “most-egregious of violations of democracy.” 20 In doing so,
executives outside of the crisis country would risk establishing precedents and rules which may
bound their own behavior in the future. Once again, the works referenced here deal mainly with
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the OAS, which provides a convenient comparison due to the overlap in membership and
historical context between it and Mercosur.
A hypothesis considering the source and severity of a threat does not conform as neatly to
any one of the theoretical frameworks discussed above. The apparent privilege of a
democratically elected incumbent would seem to fall in line with domestic-political explanations.
This is especially true if one is to argue that the actions of an incumbent are legitimized in a
sense by his or her domestic constituents, even if those actions challenge existing social-political
norms or constitutional principles. The significance of a crisis’s severity could perhaps be
understood from a domestic-political or normative perspective. Smith places crises on a
spectrum which ranges from outright coups d’état, to ‘gray area’ phenomena involving some
degree of violence or questionable political processes, to more low-grade controversies over
interpretations of electoral and procedural rules. 21 Crises in each case can have varying degrees
of domestic-political implications or challenge institutional norms to varying extents. Therefore,
the following hypothesis will be applied to crises within Mercosur:
𝐻4 : Mercosur’s response to democratic crises depends on the source and severity of the
individual threat; a more severe threat against an incumbent executive will generate a stronger
response than a less severe threat originating with an incumbent.
Methodology and Data
𝐻1 is going to be discussed mainly in terms of the Brazilian administration’s outlook on a
particular crisis. This will rely upon a chronological analysis of secondary literature, which
together elucidate Brazilian views on regionalism as a whole. Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros and
Clarissa Franzoi Dri provide an extremely helpful evaluation of their government’s regionalism
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policy by administration.22 For instance, they describe the administration of Fernando Henrique
Cardoso (1995-2002) as one largely preoccupied with the economic crisis facing the country, and
therefore not particularly concerned with the strengthening of regional institutions. Under such
conditions, a strong response to a regional crisis would not line up particularly well with Brazil’s
own outlook, insofar as the dedication of political and economic resources to foreign policy is at
odds with other domestic priorities. This logic may help to contextualize Brazil’s response to the
crises in Paraguay (1996) and Argentina (2001).
Medeiros and Dri note the increasing recognition of regionalism as a key foreign policy
direction beginning with the first term of Lula da Silva (2003-2006). Da Silva expressed a desire
for an “urgent deepening” of Mercosur, which culminated in the establishment of a directly
elected Mercosur Parliament in 2006.23 However, an important distinction may be drawn
between this perspective and that of da Silva during his second term. It has been argued that
Brazilian foreign policy since 2007 has been driven more by an interest in global polarity than by
a desire to strengthen regional cooperation. 24 This coincides with an overall decline in the status
of fellow Mercosur states as trading partners - measured in terms of exports to each state as a
percentage of all Brazilian exports - when compared to external partners like China or the United
States. Still, keen involvement in intra-Mercosur relations could strengthen Brazil’s image as a
regional leader, thus elevating its global status at the same time. This may necessitate the
evaluation of separate political and other interests which are implicit in each specific case. The
Cardoso and da Silva administrations show how the reinforcement of regional institutions may or
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may not align with a specific set of governmental preferences, with specific references also made
to certain generalized interests, such as promoting trade as a tool for domestic economic
stability.25 A review of secondary source historical literature will further examine the perspective
of Brazil on cooperation through Mercosur, especially preceding and following the time period
already covered. A qualitative analysis will evaluate the extent to which this perspective factors
into any greater institutional response to crises.
𝐻2 places the resolution of a crisis in the context of the region’s overall commitment to
democratic norms. This variable proves exceedingly difficult to measure in direct terms. Darren
Hawkins and Carolyn Shaw utilized an average of states’ overall scores from the Polity IV index
to determine roughly how committed OAS members have been to fair electoral processes across
time.26 Along the same vein, this work will examine trends in the scores assigned to each
member state by Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World report. These publications
provide two separate data points for each country, measuring the consolidation of both ‘Political
Rights’ and ‘Civil Liberties’ on a scale of 7 to 1. Each case will evaluate each member states’
scores across both categories, comparing with the scores which were given at the previous crisis
point. The hope is that this will help to tell a story of Mercosur’s involvement of democracy
protection through trends in the region’s overall embrace of liberal norms. In the concluding
sections of this work, attention will be paid to whether or not a majority of Mercosur states are
considered ’Free’ by these metrics. As Hawkins and Shaw would take care to emphasize, neither
the Polity Project nor the Freedom House publications fully capture the complexity involved in
the formation, diffusion, and adoption of governance norms; however, either can serve as a
proxy of sorts, to show how well some narrow conception of democratic norms is implemented
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on a state-by-state basis. Freedom House’s metrics are utilized in this case due to the wide
availability of the annual reports, going back at least through the 1990s when the first case study
takes place.
𝐻3 , the hypothesis concerning the configuration of prevailing political ideologies by state,
is significant due to the aforementioned surge in leftist governments within Latin America in
recent history.27 Given this history, the evaluation of this hypothesis will focus on whether or not
the actor precipitating a crisis is aligned with the so-called ‘new Left’. 28 The heads of state
present within Mercosur at the time of each particular case will be coded either as a leftist or as a
non-leftist (whether centrist or explicitly right-wing). Each case study will then evaluate
Mercosur’s crisis response in terms of the presence or lack of a leftist head of state, as well as of
potentially like-minded counterparts. For instance, taking Argentina as an example, the left-wing
Partido Justicialista would be contrasted with one of the center or right-wing parties which have
stood in opposition, such as Cambiemos. This method may not fully capture the nuances of
domestic political systems which exist in each individual country; however, it provides a
plausible means to test the theory put forth by Smith regarding the potential for transnational
solidarity within emerging political movements.
𝐻4 involves two sets of variables to weigh the severity of a threat and to consider whether
the threat arises with an incumbent executive or is levied against said incumbent. In each case,
the source of the threat will be coded in terms of a simple dichotomy, in which the events
belonging to the set are those which originate from within the executive administration rather
than without.
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Assessing the severity of a crisis will necessarily involve a range of values, since a threat
to democratic functions can take on various forms. Betsy Smith organizes the types of threats
into the categories of “coup, self-coup, electoral failure or fraud, constitutional crisis, and
democratic weakening.”29 For the purposes of this work, each case study will be calibrated in
two different categories of crises. The category representing the highest level of severity will be
a coup or self-coup, in which constitutional rules and procedures are contravened or suspended
to a significant degree. It may also be characterized by the use of violent or aggressive political
repression by the crisis state.. The lowest level includes threats which may not have discernible
constitutional implications, but nonetheless represent an erosion of confidence in democratic
norms as well as a threat to the current executive.
As noted above, the response of the Mercosur will be evaluated in the cases of five
distinct democratic crises within the member states: this includes those in Paraguay (1996 and
2012), Argentina (2001), Venezuela (2016) and Brazil (2016). Drawing on the criteria used by
Burges and Daudelin, the range of responses which have been employed in these cases is as
follows, ranked from weakest to strongest: passive support for resolution through declarations;
‘primary enforcement’ of democratic norms through diplomatic or institutional intervention; and
suspension, either from Mercosur’s deliberative bodies or additionally of the commercial
provisions of membership.30
Each case will include some brief evaluation of which hypotheses seem more or less
acceptable as explanatory mechanisms for Mercosur’s response, given the available facts. The
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case studies will be followed by a further discussion of which explanatory factors seem most
prevalent across the various cases.

19

Case Study #1: Paraguay 1996
In Paraguay, a democratic crisis began in April of 1996, resulting from insubordination
on the part of General Lino César Oviedo, which amounted to a coup attempt against thenPresident Juan Carlos Wasmosy.31 A resignation had been requested from Oviedo, and his
refusal to comply initiated a tense standoff at the highest level of the Paraguayan government.
Paraguay’s continental neighbors – particularly its Mercosur partners, ever wary of threats from
military actors – viewed this refusal plainly as a perversion of constitutional rules and were quick
to offer support. Arturo Valenzuela places this moment within the historical context of a
relatively small and poor state which had “virtually no tradition of democratic governance.” 32
Corruption remained a feature of the Paraguayan system after it returned to democracy, and
Oviedo routinely tested the president by weighing in on policy while also openly plotting his
own campaign for executive office. His emergence as a challenger to presidential authority
would represent a considerable challenge for Paraguay’s nascent democratic institutions.
Valenzuela also emphasizes just how quickly a response came from the international
community.33 Wasmosy asked for General Oviedo’s resignation on the morning of April 22,
which was refused. By that evening, a statement of condemnation had arrived from the embassy
of the United States, as well as a joint one from Paraguay’s Mercosur partners. Amid an
outpouring of support from various actors and organizations, both domestically and abroad,
Wasmosy was able to secure Oviedo’s removal.
Should Mercosur have decided to respond with more than a simple condemnation, further
sanctions would have been unprecedented – even legally questionable, in the view of Uruguayan
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ambassador Antonio Mercader. After all, the organization itself had not codified any specific
commitments to democratic norms.34 The Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment would
not be signed until 1998. Despite this, César Gaviria, the Secretary General of the OAS,
described the role of Mercosur’s leadership in resolving the crisis as both critical and
“extraordinarily prompt.”35 Mercosur’s actions in resolving the crisis were seen as particularly
relevant because by this point it had been estimated that about one third of Paraguay’s foreign
trade had fallen under its provisions.
But Valenzuela does not see commercial incentives as the primary reason for the
conflict’s favorable outcome.36 Far more significant in his view is the diffusion of democratic
ideals throughout the region. Paraguay was one in a regional community of states which had
begun to embrace the notion of strong democratic governance. Both at the state and popular level
of analysis, this community was increasingly cognizant of the conditions which might cause
democracy to deteriorate once again. If Paraguay had been allowed to regress, then the
motivations guiding the greater regional community would face questions in perpetuity.
Mercosur did work quickly to formulate a response, which was seen by international
observers as effective. However, the mechanisms proving the organization’s effectiveness are
debatable; this may have more to do with the tutelage of democratic ideals than with the threat of
commercial or financial harm. In any case, Mercosur would retroactively legitimize its actions
two years after the crisis by enjoining its members to the Ushuaia Protocol, formalizing a general
commitment to democracy.37 This commitment would seek to bind the members not only in their
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internal functions, but in their extended bilateral relations as well (Chile and Bolivia are also
signatories).

Case Analysis
𝐻 : Brazilian Hegemony
As stated in the ‘Methodology’ section, 𝐻 is the ‘hypothesis of hegemony’, which
focuses on Brazil’s perspective as Mercosur’s largest member. The immediate response of
Brazil’s ambassador to Paraguay which is alluded to in the OAS’s summary of events suggests a
high level of concern for the situation vis-à-vis General Oviedo. Valenzuela points out that the
ambassador had been in direct contact with President Wasmosy in the days leading up to
Oviedo’s resignation, and that they coordinated closely on official communications during this
time.38
It might be said that with Mercosur facing the first test of its institutional resolve, the
protection of Paraguay’s democracy is a compelling interest unto itself. It is unclear if the
Brazilian administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) saw any significant
material benefit in restoring the status quo. Paraguay’s international trade had relied quite
heavily on Mercosur members. Brazil’s economic outlook, on the other hand, is guided by
Madeiros and Dri’s assertion that the nation is “the least dependent on Mercosur.” 39 However,
some scholars look beyond the regional level, placing Brazil’s policy toward Mercosur within
the context of an increasingly decentralized and multipolar world. Tullo Vigevani and Haroldo
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Ramanzini Júnior state that “Ever since it appeared, the Mercosur has been considered the basis
of Brazil's strategy of international insertion.” 40
The ‘insertion’ mentioned here refers to the attempts by a particular state to fill the power
vacuum left by the recent conclusion of the Cold War. With the Soviet Union ceasing to exist as
a bipolar superpower, a realist paradigm would hold that other states seek to enhance their own
status as global competitors. And to these two authors, Brazil’s hegemony within the region and
Mercosur is not merely a foregone conclusion based on landmass, population, and economic
output – it is an object of state soft power which will enhance the nation’s image globally.
Resolving a constitutional crisis in the much-smaller state of Paraguay may not represent a
policy priority for the Cardoso administration by all accounts. However, when it comes to
regional leadership, first impressions seem to be of the utmost importance. It is for this reason
that Brazil’s keen diplomatic interest in resolving the 1996 constitutional crisis should be
expected.
For the purposes of this work, it is argued that 𝐻 is consistent, though not particularly
compelling, with this case. Sean Burges and Jean Daudelin ascribe Brazil’s response with the
highest possible magnitude score, indicating “primary enforcement” through declaration and
diplomatic intervention.41 Of the 27 crises throughout the Americas which are examined in their
work, the 1996 case is one of only five to receive such a score. This intervention relied upon
existing diplomatic channels, as Brazil’s ambassador had already maintained a close presence in
relation to President Wasmosy. The magnitude of Brazil’s response could be explained by its
relatively low cost. However, there is also the fact that this is Brazil’s first test in crisis resolution
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as a member of Mercosur, and the application of Mercosur protocol seems singularly important
in this case compared to most subsequent ones. 42
It is concluded here that a more heavy-handed response is consistent with Brazilian
interests, even if this assumption has more to do with precedent and global standing than it does
with the stability of Brazil-Paraguay relations. 𝐻 is thus accepted as a possible predictor of
Mercosur’s behavior in this case.

𝐻 : Regional Norms
𝐻 represents the ‘regional norms hypothesis’, which evaluates whether or not
Mercosur’s response to a crisis might be predicted by its members’ collective level of
commitment to democratic values.
Freedom House’s 1996-97 Freedom in the World report conferred the Mercosur countries
an average Political Rights score of 2.25, and an average Civil Liberties score of 3 (in this case, a
higher value indicates poorer condition). At this point, Paraguay and Brazil were categorized by
Freedom House as ‘Partly Free’. In the case of Brazil, a slide into ‘Partly Free’ territory is
attributed to violations against members of the press, a “weak judiciary,” and rampant police
violence.43 Paraguay’s entry in the report makes explicit reference to the crisis of 1996, as well
as the “dubious” primary which brought President Wasmosy into power in the first place. 44 It
further points to violent crackdowns against union activity, and possible government complicity
in transnational drug trafficking.
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Meanwhile, Mercosur’s other two members, Argentina, and Uruguay, display an aboveaverage commitment to political rights and civil liberties. In the first category, Uruguay is rated a
perfect ‘1’ for the 1996-97 edition, which is an improvement over the three years prior. For civil
liberties it scores a ‘2’, which is consistent in all prior editions dating back to 1990-91. Argentina
stands one degree lower in both categories. Freedom House notes a slight deterioration in
political rights since 1990, while the perception of civil liberties has held during the same period.
Figure 1 below highlights how Freedom House’s observations fare compared to 15 years before
the crisis, when military or civil-military regimes still prevailed throughout much of the region.

Figure 1: Comparison of Freedom in the World Ratings of Mercosur States, 1981-82 & 1996-97
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Looking at Figure 1, it is evident that there has been a significant net increase in the
perception of democracy across the bloc (except for Brazil, where this is only evident within the
topic of Political Rights). This is consistent with the historical context already given, where a
near-simultaneous embrace of democratic rule of law is part of what helped create Mercosur to
begin with.
It ought to go without saying that all four of these states have increased their standing
since emerging from dictatorial regimes. The desire to establish strong democratic institutions
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has yielded some form of multi-party contestation, as well as separation of powers, across all
four nations, implying the diffusion and tutelage of liberal norms. The regional norms hypothesis
may yet prove viable, but this will be further discussed in aggregate as case studies proceed in
chronological order. The overall trend up to this point, whereby states within the bloc have
received upgrades from ‘Not Free’ or ‘Partly Free’ status, would suggest that a strong response is
consistent with 𝐻 .

𝐻 : Ideology
𝐻 , also referred to here as the ‘ideology hypothesis’, examines how competing political
orientations amongst Mercosur’s heads of state may influence crisis outcomes. In the case of
Paraguay, Wasmosy would govern as a member of the Colorado Party. A dominant force in
national politics, the party is commonly associated with right-wing traditionalism and
nationalism.45 In terms of how Mercosur’s other heads of state align on a traditional left-right
spectrum, Wasmosy would likely find little solidarity. Heads of state in 1996 included:
Argentina’s Carlos Menem, a member of the Peronist Partido Justicialista; Fernando Cardoso of
Brazil’s Social Democracy Party; and Julio Sanguinetti of Uruguay’s own Colorado Party.
Political leftism in Paraguay, as in the ‘New Left’ elsewhere in South America, displays
several defining features. Among these are a strong identification with the struggles of the
working class, and a rejection of certain tenets of globalization and austerity (such as
privatization, fiscal moderation, and liberalization of capital flows). 46 According to a brief
historical review by Gustavo Flores-Macías, this brand of leftism would not enter the region until
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Venezuela’s election of Hugo Chávez in 1998. 47 Prior to this, he suggests, even the more socially
moderate or left-leaning of the aforementioned governments embraced “an open, marketoriented model of development,” which eschewed the protectionist tendencies now associated
with left-wing populism.
All of this is to suggest that competing political ideologies do not provide a particularly
compelling explanation in the case of Paraguay’s 1996 constitutional crisis. The ‘New Left’ with
which authors such as Smith and Flores-Macías take interest did not become a factor until after
this episode had concluded, and so no state-level counterparts would see a compelling interest in
alignment, at least not in the same way that later cases might show. Therefore, 𝐻 is largely
unsupported in this case.

𝐻 : Severity
𝐻 is termed the ‘severity hypothesis’, as it examines the magnitude of a crisis and its
implications, as well as what party is mainly affected. For reference on this second point, the
1996 crisis represents a threat against an incumbent, democratically-elected executive by an
official of the Paraguayan armed forces. As far as severity is concerned, Valenzuela at one point
simply characterizes Oviedo’s actions as “military insubordination.” 48 Other than in the title of
his paper, he does not employ the term ‘coup’ to describe any events other than those which
brought about Paraguay’s democracy in the first place.
At the same time, that he would seek to usurp Wasmosy’s executive authority would
certainly suggest a challenge to the nation’s constitutional fabric. Specifically, this would violate
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Article 173 of Paraguay’s constitution, which states that “military [personnel] on active service .
. . may not join any political party or movement, or realize any type of political activity.” 49 This
language is quite possibly applicable to his failure to recognize presidential authority. Betsy
Smith plainly identifies this episode as an “attempted civil-military coup”, as well as a crisis of
the utmost severity.50 Valenzuela emphasizes the drama of the events, pointing out Oviedo’s
threat that an unfavorable outcome could result in “rivers of blood.” 51 The conclusion that this
episode represents a severe constitutional crisis is certainly well-met, as any acquiescence on the
part of President Wasmosy could have led to a drastic deterioration in the democraticallyinvested authority of both the executive and the legislature. Oviedo’s encroachments on
presidential power, left unchecked, might have paved the way for a new brand of militaryfocused strongman rule, not to mention state violence.
It is held here that the 1996 constitutional crisis is a high-severity event. This, coupled
with the nature of threats against incumbent executives by outside actors, would predict a strong
response. This certainly seems to suggest that the severity hypothesis is consistent – compelling,
even - within the context of this case study, given the haste with which diplomatic interventions
were organized by Paraguay’s Mercosur partners.
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Case Study #2: Argentina 2001
The second case study of this work examines the economic depression which affected
Argentina from late 2001 to early 2002. The origin of the ‘Argentine Great Depression’ was an
initiative, formally beginning in 1991, which pegged the Argentine Peso 1:1 to the United States
Dollar. The convertibility plan, supported by President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) and finance
minister Domingo Cavallo, would theoretically allow most business to be conducted through
both currencies. This would provide much-needed monetary stability after years of
hyperinflation dating back to before the 1976 coup. 52 This monetary policy was accompanied by
sweeping market reforms which Argentina undertook to attract loans from the International
Monetary Fund under the auspices of the Washington Consensus. This would mean cutting
government expenditures, privatizing key infrastructures, and allowing capital to flow into the
country more freely.
Heather Schamis points out that the resulting influx of IMF and private investments did
contribute to economic stability and growth in the short term. However, the artificial re-valuation
of the Peso would contribute to disequilibrium after several years. The Argentine economy, both
at the aggregate and consumer levels, would come to rely heavily on imported goods. This would
lead to a net outflow of currency by the mid-nineties, for which foreign direct investment in
domestic enterprises could not compensate. 53 Thus, with more monies leaving the economy than
entering, the government would have to exhaust its foreign currency reserves in order to
maintain the 1:1 convertibility and its associated banking functions. This eventually became
untenable. By the new year, the Peso had been allowed to depreciate, beginning a long trend of
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hyperinflation. Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001), who succeeded Menem at the expiration of the
latter’s term, resigned on 20 December.
The events of late 2001 had profound social and economic implications going into the
new year. Peruzzotti notes an increase in the unemployment rate up to 22 percent; a contraction
of the gross domestic product to “1993 levels,” erasing most gains that would have been
observed from the convertibility and liberalization plans; and soaring poverty rates. 54 Cavallo
began pushing for certain stop-gap measures to mitigate runs on the Peso, leading to the corralito
policies in which bank withdrawals were limited. This directly led to massive protests around the
country, and particularly within the capital of Buenos Aires.
The political implications of the crisis are of primary importance to this work. De la Rúa
did not have a sitting Vice President at the time of his exit, as the one elected alongside him had
already resigned. As such, Argentina’s constitutional provisions and presidential order of
succession would be tested. The nation experienced a now-infamous episode in which five
presidents served in a span of only two weeks. After De la Rúa, the next four executives would
be interim presidents vested by the national Senate or the Chamber of Deputies to serve until the
next election, to be held in April of 2003.
Corrales notes that the Argentine depression was shocking to many observers because of
the progress that the country had made in building stable institutions, and the way this progress
was immediately set back.55 Since the fall of the dictatorship in 1983, the nation was firmly
under civilian control. A powerful legislature seemed poised to keep would-be strongmen in
check. The immediate and widespread destitution caused by the 2001 crash seemed to diminish
the public’s faith that their democratic government could create prosperity. Following the events

54
55

Peruzzotti, E. "Argentina after the Crash,” 86.
Corrales, “The Politics of Argentina’s Meltdown,” 29.

30

of 20 December, the responsibility of ensuring continuity of government ultimately fell to
Argentina’s legislature. There was no guarantee at the time that the executive power vacuum
would have been filled peacefully through constitutional and deliberative processes. In fact, only
a few short decades ago, it would not have been unusual for a military junta or other strongman
actor to attempt a usurpation of executive power.
And yet, as many scholars observe, the political consequences turned out to be not nearly
as severe as they could have been. Jonas Wolff takes the view that Argentina’s institutions
remained surprisingly strong given a crisis that could be compared “only to the Great Depression
of the 1930s.”56 A stable executive had been established, and its line of succession stayed intact
even through the crisis. Wolff credits this stability in large part to a multifaceted relief effort on
the part of the Duhalde administration (2002-2003). This included cash payments to unemployed
individuals, a cessation of debt payments, and high-level dialogue with social movement
organizers.57 In a way, the Argentine crisis seems to have been alleviated by a reinforcement of
democratic norms, rather than an erosion thereof. The administration followed popular sentiment
by rejecting the terms of its IMF program, and actively sought to make broad sectors of the
population feel heard in the lead-up to the 2003 general election.

Response of Mercosur
Given the lesser political implications of this crisis, there was less diplomatic urgency for
Argentina’s Mercosur partners to respond. Carranza suggests that Mercosur’s answer to this case
was to accommodate Argentina within existing institutional decision-making frameworks. The
Common Market Council, the main deliberative body of Mercosur at this time, held certain
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targets for when its members would eliminate external tariffs and move toward becoming a ‘true’
customs union. However, when concerns arose about Argentina’s ability to meet its sovereign
debt obligations, the CMC accepted an “emergency package” which included a 35 percent tariff
on “consumer goods from outside Mercosur.” 58 Carranza further notes that the Cardoso
administration of Brazil had at one point objected to this allowance, but the bloc nonetheless
made it clear that it would remain flexible to Argentina’s needs.
Mercosur did make strides to support Argentina’s international relations, calling upon
institutions like the IMF to extend emergency relief.59 These calls were echoed by the
governments of Chile and Bolivia. While perhaps more of a token gesture, this does demonstrate
the willingness of the Mercosur states to operationalize their collective bargaining power on the
world stage. Still, the rhetoric coming from Argentina’s neighbors around January of 2002
suggests a high level of confidence in Argentina’s domestic institutions, and interest in a direct
intervention by Mercosur was accordingly low.

Case Analysis
𝐻 : Brazilian Hegemony
Brazil’s place in this episode is quite unique, as it arguably played a role in exacerbating
the crisis to begin with. To highlight this, Mario Carranza points to the turbulent conditions of
Brazil’s own economy during the 1990s. The Cardoso administration had attempted to tackle
inflation by introducing a fixed exchange rate regime similar to Argentina’s. However, in 1999,
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after just around five years, the Brazilian Real had been allowed to depreciate by “nearly 40
percent.”60
Devaluation is a monetary policy tool which may provide economic stimulus by making
a nation’s goods cheaper to foreign buyers, promoting export volume in the short term. What
makes this relevant to the Argentine crisis is that such devaluations may be met with hostility
from states whose industries would be in competition. Argentina had already sacrificed some of
its monetary policy autonomy by engaging in convertibility; the depreciation of the Real meant
that the Peso was far overvalued by comparison, making Peso-denominated exports far less
competitive.
One solution offered by Carranza would be the building of more robust “supranational
institutions” within the framework of Mercosur, which could harmonize exchange rates and trade
policy between members.61 For a nation plagued by a recent history of monetary instability,
Brazil might not wish to delegate any agency on such matters to a multilateral body. At the same
time, in 2001 Argentina was Brazil’s second-largest trading partner in terms of both export and
import shares according to World Bank data (behind the United States in both categories). 62 With
Argentina alone accounting for around 8.6 percent of Brazil’s exports, the former’s stability
represents an apparent economic interest.
Given such an interest, this hypothesis would predict some form of response on the part
of Brazil to support the rule of law in neighboring Argentina. According to Sean Burges and Jean
Daudelin, this would come in the form of “passive support for enforcement” in the form of
declarations of support for the Argentine government. 63 Brazil’s leading role in advocating for
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Argentina on the global stage implies that this case is consistent with 𝐻 . The immediate
economic benefits of maintaining stability in Argentina provide that such a response should be
expected from Mercosur.

𝐻 : Regional Norms
As of the 2001-2002 Freedom in the World report, the four Mercosur member states
display a mean Political Rights score of 2.75, and a mean Civil Liberties score of 2.5. Across
both categories, there appears to be no substantial change in Freedom House’s quantitative
evaluations over the 5 years preceding this edition. A state-by-state breakdown of the findings
from each of the corresponding reports may be found in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Comparison of Freedom in the World Ratings of Mercosur States, 1996-97 & 2001-02
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The most striking observation considering the given case is the perceived deterioration of
Argentina’s political atmosphere. Freedom House’s analysis attributes the score increase to such
facts as the resignation of a democratically elected president in De la Rúa, as well as a drop in
perceived public safety due to crime levels. 64 A connection between these and the overarching
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economic concerns of the time seems evident – the 2002 report also expresses a not-necessarilyrelated preoccupation with corruption amongst executive and judicial offices.
The convergence of economic, social, and political occurrences within Argentina was
enough to mark a downgrade from ‘Free’ to ‘Partly Free’ status. However, the level of
commitment to democratic norms by the bloc remains nearly the same as in the prior case. This
would suggest that 𝐻 is certainly no more consistent here than it is with the Paraguay case.
Consider also the perspective of those such as Wolff, who attributes the crisis’s resolution more
to the Argentine government’s own measures than to exogenous intervention. Steven Levitsky
and María Victoria Murillo also note the surprisingly smooth operation of the country’s 2003
elections in the aftermath of these measures. 65 The commitment of the region as a whole does not
appear significant in this case, and so 𝐻 is not supported.
𝐻 : Ideology
In the previous case, ideology was not supported as a particularly strong explanatory
mechanism for explaining Mercosur’s response. Here, the transnational political conditions
remain quite the same. As in 1996, both the Uruguayan and Paraguayan iterations of the
Colorado Party remain in power, albeit with different heads of state (Jorge Batlle in the former
and Luis Ángel González Macchi in the latter). In Brazil, the Cardoso administration remains
during this period. Argentina itself saw a transition from the Justicialist Party, then led by Carlos
Menem, to the centrist66 Radical Civic Union (UCR) led by Fernando de la Rúa.
With respect to the 2001 crisis, 𝐻 continues to be unsupported by the evidence at hand.
Left-wing populism has yet to be embraced at the executive level within the Mercosur states, and
political moderation prevails. This conclusion is bolstered by Corrales’s observation of the so65
66

Levitsky & Murillo, “Argentina Weathers the Storm,” 157.
Ibid., 153.

35

called “state-without-a-party condition.” 67 Under this condition, Argentina is difficult to
categorize along ideological lines because its very government seems conflicted on the matter,
executive and legislative leaders diverging on the execution of key policy tenets. Although he
left office in 1999, Carlos Menem perhaps established a precedent for such disconnects by
embracing free-market liberalization despite his Peronist party’s history of left-wing populism
and protectionism. With the significance of ideological alignments being so difficult to establish
at both the national and regional level, 𝐻 is not supported within this case.
𝐻 : Severity
The 2001 economic crisis would seem to represent a threat from without, similarly to the
Paraguay case. However, this case shows more of a stress test against Argentina’s constitutional
order broadly, rather than a threat against a specific incumbent.
As for severity, this crisis is taken as a much more low-impact event in terms of its effect
on the level of democratic consolidation. As mentioned above, the political impact was managed
not through heavy-handed threats against the constitutional order or the rule of law, but rather by
embracing the principles of democracy. The presidential order of succession was maintained in a
way that invited continuous consultation from the national legislature and judiciary. Although it
may be the case that socioeconomic conditions deteriorated significantly for many populations
within Argentina, the constitution and overall system of governance remained intact. This is
consistent with a low-severity event, which would predict a similarly weak response from
Argentina’s regional partners. Overall, 𝐻 is supported as consistent with the material facts of the
case.
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Case Study #3: Paraguay 2012
June of 2012 would see the removal of Paraguay’s president, Fernando Lugo, through a
formal impeachment process. Lugo had been in a rocky relationship with the country’s
opposition parties since his election in 2008.68 Talk of impeachment would reach a head on June
15, when 11 land reform protesters and six police officers were killed in a confrontation at a
property near the Brazilian border. When it came time for the legislature to react, only two days
were needed to formally decide Lugo’s fate, from the passage of the articles of impeachment to
the vote for removal from office. In the first step the Chamber of Deputies voted 76-1, and in the
second the Senate voted 39-4.
Journalists covering the events suggested an array of conditions which may help to
explain the legislature’s immediate and decisive action. Lugo’s popularity was affected by
personal scandals, recurring protests like the one leading to the aforementioned confrontation,
and rumors of a self-coup attempt.69 Lugo’s very rise to power is a significant condition in itself.
He was elected as a “left-of-centre candidate,” and was the first to not represent the longdominant Colorado Party.70 The removal of this new-look president might have brought about a
government more sympathetic to a political agenda which had developed over the previous
decades.
Mercosur Response
The leaders of Mercosur’s individual member states were quick to issue denunciations of
the impeachment and removal process. Dilma Rousseff of Brazil and Cristina Fernández de
Kirchner of Argentina called for Paraguay’s suspension, predicated on the belief that the
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caretaker government replacing Lugo was illegitimate. 71 Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, who had
signed a protocol of accession to Mercosur by this point, also issued a condemnation. 72 There
were concerns about the specific process of the impeachment. Such proceedings elsewhere might
resemble a sort of jury trial, with a thorough examination of evidence from both sides. Lugo, on
the other hand, was merely called to testify briefly in his own defense before the Senate voted on
removal. This led to all three of Lugo’s aforementioned counterparts using the term ‘coup’ to
describe the events. The term certainly fits in the sense that an elected executive was deposed by
competing institutional interests. But this would represent another type of coup, one which is
carried out by following the letter of the constitution rather than by suspending its terms.
Geraldo Vidigal provides a helpful timeline of Mercosur’s collective response to Lugo’s
impeachment.73 Near the end of June, a summit was convened in Mendoza, Argentina. The other
three nations collectively decided that Paraguay would be suspended from the deliberative
processes, citing the commitment to democratic norms embodied by the Ushuaia Protocol.
Interestingly, this suspension directly permitted the admission of Venezuela to the bloc as a full
member – Paraguay had been the only state to not have domestically ratified its accession
protocol.

Case Analysis
𝐻 : Brazilian Hegemony
There are few changes to the logic underpinning Brazil-Paraguay relations since the 1996
coup attempt. As a nation more than 30 times more populous as of 2012, Brazil’s dependence on
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Paraguay is much less profound than the reverse. However, as with the crisis that faced
Wasmosy, a Brazilian intervention through established diplomatic channels would not incur a
significant cost. And this time, should Brazil choose to speak up about the state of democratic
norms within Mercosur, the Ushuaia Protocol would provide a statutory basis for doing so.
In this case there is also some interest in the 2009 agreement that was reached between
Paraguay and Brazil over the utilization of the hydroelectric dam at Itaipu. The dam sits on the
border between the two countries, and since Paraguay had been using only 5 percent of its
capacity, questions had arisen over the sharing and trading of surplus power. 74 Lugo and Brazil’s
then-president Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva had agreed to allocate any such surplus to Brazilian
enterprises at highly advantageous prices. The initial demand for energy resources in the southwestern border regions of Brazil might have convinced Da Silva and Rousseff to maintain the
status quo by defending the Lugo administration.
As the region’s leading economic power, Brazil may also be interested in Mercosur’s
potential replacement of Paraguay with Venezuela. One ought to consider what Guy Emerson
describes as an “ideological affinity” between the Brazilian Workers’ Party (that of Da Silva and
Rousseff) and Venezuela’s United Socialist Party (represented by Chávez and later Nicolás
Maduro).75 Emerson suggests that the entrance of Venezuela, with its relatively large and oil-rich
economy, would help to enhance Brazilian leadership rather than challenge it. As mentioned
previously, Paraguay’s suspension from Mercosur’s decision-making processes would directly
enable this.
The relationship between Fernando Lugo and the Brazilian administration seems to
represent a mutually beneficial status quo in some areas. Moreover, any attempt to defend Lugo
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through direct diplomatic intervention would represent a relatively low commitment on Brazil’s
part. At the same time, the prospect of strengthening multilateral ties with Venezuela would also
seem to align well with long-term Brazilian goals. Whether Brazil’s primary interest in this case
should be the protection of Paraguayan democracy or the integration of a new ally is unclear, but
both lines of reasoning would be consistent with a strong response. A suspension of Paraguay
sends a message to domestic actors who would circumvent democratic processes, and would also
provide new synergies with Venezuela. Thus, it is concluded that Brazil would be interested in a
strong response to the Paraguay crisis, and 𝐻 is supported.

𝐻 : Regional Norms
Figure 3 below examines the state of the Mercosur nations since the previous episode,
through the 2013 edition of the Freedom in the World report. On aggregate, the region has seen a
significant improvement in the average values for both Political Rights and Civil Liberties – 2.75
and 2.5 to 2 and 2, respectively. Brazil and Argentina, the two larger states, saw an uninterrupted
improvement and consolidation of perceived freedoms. The 2013 report specifically commends
Argentina’s recovery from the economic crisis, while promoting continued vigilance when it
comes to such concerns as press freedom and corruption. 76 The 2013 edition is the first to reflect
the impeachment proceedings against Lugo. This event was of paramount concern, and the
authors lament the apparent contradiction of popular will by the legislature. 77

Figure 3: Comparison of Freedom in the World Ratings of Mercosur States, 2001-02 & 2013
2001-2002
2013
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The strides taken throughout the region to consolidate democratic norms are taken as
important preconditions of Mercosur’s response. Paraguay has seen some perceived
consolidation of democratic norms since the 1996 coup attempt, and its partners have likewise
come to embrace democracy protection as a key function of the organization. In this case, 𝐻
would be consistent with a stronger response than what might have been expected in previous
years or decades.
𝐻 : Ideology
This case shows the first signs of ideological alignment playing a role in Mercosur’s
crisis response, unlike in previous episodes where this was hardly considered within existing
literature. Fernando Lugo is coded as a ‘leftist president’ for the purposes of this work, building
upon the sentiments of Masteintredet et al. They argue that Lugo’s removal was predisposed to
be met with a stronger response from the “left-leaning governments in Argentina, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela.”78 Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), once a cabinet minister in the
administration of Lula da Silva, could be classified along the same lines.
Given Betsy Smith’s analysis on the role of leftist ideologies in predicting crisis response,
it is assumed here that an emerging ‘club’ of left-leaning heads of state will seek to protect each
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other’s political interests at home and abroad. That Lugo would share an alignment with
Paraguay’s two largest neighbors might predict a stronger response in his defense. Therefore, an
above-average reaction to the impeachment would support 𝐻 in this case.
𝐻 : Severity
The forced removal of an executive by the nation’s legislature represents a type of crisis
distinct from the military coups of the past. While the president would be removed and replaced,
the rest of the government would continue to function as normal, and constitutional rules are not
outright suspended, at least in the typical case. And the Constitution of Paraguay does provide
for the removal of the President in cases of mal desempeño (translated as “malfeasance [of their
functions]”79). This language itself has faced criticism and calls for reform from legal scholars,
who believe that the criteria for removal should be narrowed to specific statutory violations. 80
And insofar as all of Mercosur’s presidents are directly elected by the public, such an abrupt
removal constitutes a significant disruption of democratic principles.
Still, Kathryn Hochstetler observes that the ‘interrupted presidency’ had by this point
become a relatively common phenomenon in South American politics. 81 By 2003, the year in
which her study on such events concludes, a whole 40 percent of presidents throughout the
continent had the remainder of their terms threatened by some combination of legislative
intervention and public pressure. Twenty-three percent were ultimately subjected to early
terminations. It may be an encouraging sign that periods of political uncertainty are not cut
through by military actors. Lugo’s removal by legal processes is decidedly lower in severity than
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a total suspension of the constitutional order. Still, the figures shown in Hochstetler’s work beg
the question of how uncertainty might wear down the public’s confidence in democratic systems.
Lugo’s impeachment is identified here as a low-severity crisis, which is in line with
Smith’s classification.82 This severity ought to be aggravated in the eyes of other states by the
existence of a threat against an incumbent president. 𝐻 would likely predict a moderate
response through direct diplomatic intervention, similar to what was seen in the 1996 coup
attempt. It does not seem to adequately explain why this is the first instance of a Mercosur
member being outright suspended. 𝐻 is not well-supported here, being the most ill-suited for
explaining the events in Paraguay.
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Case Study #4: Venezuela 2014-2017
The case of Venezuela deals with a more protracted and continuous crisis than what has
been explored in previous sections. Upon Mercosur’s suspension of Paraguay, which would last
from 2012 until their next presidential election in April of 2013, Venezuela would be admitted as
a full member of the bloc. This is despite the country’s struggles with maintaining constitutional
checks and balances. Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) of the United Socialist Party, or PSUV, came to
came into power while also ushering in a new constitution. This legal order naturally provided
for a strong executive, and between 1999 and 2010 the National Assembly would grant Chávez
extensive authority to regulate and restrict mass media, as well as certain forms of civic
participation.83 The situation in Venezuela represents what Nancy Bermeo might identify as
“executive aggrandizement,” or a process by which elected officials wear down the checks on
their own power.84 Such a condition is unprecedented in other Mercosur states since the bloc’s
founding; compare it, for instance, with the conditions in Argentina that enabled a strong
legislature to ensure continuity of government in the midst of an economic crisis. The
delegitimization of Venezuela’s democratic institutions arguably precludes it from being
characterized as a democracy by 2012, as defined by the terms of the Ushuaia Protocol.
Venezuela would be an active player in regional politics beginning in the early 2000s,
drawing on Chávez’s diplomatic ambitions. Kristin Brown traces Venezuela’s motivation for
membership back to what the Chávez administration saw as a threat of “U.S. imperialism” within
the hemisphere.85 Until 2006, Venezuela had been a full member of the Andean Community
(CAN, for “Comunidad Andina”), a free trade and customs union which included most of the
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South American states not already included within Mercosur. When fellow members Peru and
Colombia signed bilateral trade agreements with the United States in 2005 and 2006,
respectively, the perceived threat to CAN’s bargaining power pushed Chávez to seek an
alternative organization.
As mentioned previously, nondemocratic conditions in Venezuela did not prevent its
accession in the first place. Repressive political conditions existed almost since the very
beginning of chavismo. These conditions alone would not provide for strong sanctions from
Mercosur, but they would precipitate a domestic crisis which would eventually demand the
bloc’s attention. Thomas Legler and Ornela Garelli-Ríos point to mass protests in 2014 as the
key jumping-off point for the crisis examined here.86 Chávez’s protégé and successor as
president, Nicolás Maduro (2013-), was facing challenges from student groups over economic
policies leading to scarcities and inflation. Initial protests in February of 2014 saw the detention
of 13 students, and subsequent escalations led to three protesters being shot dead by unidentified
assailants.87 In a report published in January of 2019, Human Rights Watch notes that protests
continued ever since, triggering a pattern of arrests and other government abuses. Totals include
26 killed just in that month, and over 13,000 total detentions. 88 Notable state crackdowns
occurred in 2014 and 2017.
Response of Mercosur
Venezuela was formally suspended from Mercosur and all its institutions in August of
201789, a status quo which continues to the present. The foreign ministers of the bloc’s four
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founding members referenced the controversial Constituent National Assembly election the
previous month, in addition to the deaths and imprisonments associated with the anti-government
protests.90 However, it was stressed, particularly by the Brazilian government, that Mercosur’s
commercial provisions would continue to extend to Venezuela. The hope at the time was that the
humanitarian crisis would not be exacerbated by a cancellation of free trade and free movement.
The biggest shift would be that Venezuela would no longer have any official input on the
direction of Mercosur’s trade and customs policy, nor would it be able to occupy any positions of
authority therein.
Following the suspension, a perfect storm of political factors and events would contribute
to a sort of self-coup, an advancement of Venezuela’s existing trend of executive
aggrandizement which had eroded the legal authority of the legislature. A recall referendum
would be cancelled in late 2016 “on constitutionally dubious grounds.” 91 In March of 2017, the
Supreme Court, which had been stacked by the Maduro government, suspended the National
Assembly’s duties entirely. This decision would enable the president to essentially rule by
decree, as well as to call elections on an irregular basis.

Case Analysis
𝐻 : Brazilian Hegemony
Legler and Garelli-Ríos suggest that Brazil may have been “distracted” in their initial
response to the Venezuelan crisis, as talk of impeachment proceedings against Dilma Rousseff
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began in late 2015.92 At the same time, the very beginning of Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur
caused some unease in Brazil. Both they and Argentina may have felt threatened by Chávez’s
early alignment with Uruguay and Paraguay over the perceived threat of economic
“imperialism”; the latter two countries had clashed with Mercosur’s larger members to defend
their trade-protectionist policies.93
Palestini explicitly identifies the Venezuela crisis as an instance in which Brazil’s
interests (and Argentina’s, for that matter) are aligned with the United States’ distaste for the
PSUV.94 At the time of Venezuela’s suspension, Rousseff had been replaced by a Brazilian
administration which was perhaps less inclined to support the chavista regime; this will be
discussed further with respect to 𝐻 . All of this seems to suggest that Brazil would be interested
in a stronger response to Venezuela’s transgressions. The fact of Venezuela’s ultimate
suspension from Mercosur, then, is consistent with the terms of 𝐻 .
𝐻 : Regional Norms
As Figure 4 below shows, the four founding members’ commitment to democracy seems
to remain as strong as in the previous case. While Paraguay’s progress may leave something to
be desired, observations of the other three states would predict a steadfast commitment to liberal
democratic norms. The only backsliding of the regional baseline occurs due to the incorporation
of Venezuela, a state with a much more troubled history with respect to institutional stability and
civil liberties.
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Figure 4: Comparison of Freedom in the World Ratings of Mercosur States, 2013 & 2017
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A summary of the 2017 edition of the Freedom in the World report highlights Venezuela
as one of three countries (alongside Egypt and Ethiopia) in a feature titled “The False Promise of
Strongman Rule.”95 It suggests that the oil, a key source of revenue in Venezuela, had
experienced dramatic price fluctuations in the preceding years, and the effects of this instability
were exacerbated by corruption. Repression and executive aggrandizement characterized the
political atmosphere around this time, while hyperinflation worsened the material living
conditions of the Venezuelan people. The trend in Venezuela’s Freedom House ratings since
2013 is marked by only a slight erosion in Political Rights. However, this was enough to see a
downgrade from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” status. This development, reflecting events during
2016, may serve to predict why an initially tolerant Mercosur would finally decide to act against
Venezuela.
For the purposes of this case study, 𝐻 seems to yield mixed outlooks. An erosion of
political rights in Venezuela between 2012 and 2017 may help to explain why the country was
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eventually suspended from Mercosur. At the same time, Venezuela’s very admittance to
Mercosur appears as an exceptional case, in which the other four governments expressed
tolerance of already poor political conditions. The relatively high level of domestic democratic
consolidation in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay did not predict whether Venezuela would be
included or excluded to begin with, so it would seem unreasonable for the same to predict strong
sanctions against Venezuela. Thus, 𝐻 sees only partial support at best. One might expect the
relatively well-established democracies within the region to recognize a suspension-worthy
pattern of transgressions. However, in the face of alternative explanations relating to hegemony,
ideology, and severity, 𝐻 does not seem to provide an adequate prediction.
𝐻 : Ideology
As noted within the previous case, Venezuela’s admission was at one point backed by the
administrations of Argentina and Brasil.96 Former Argentine president Cristina Fernández de
Kirchner (2007-2015) is a member of the ‘Pink Tide’ of left-wing populism, representing a form
of the Peronist politics which have been prevalent in national history. Dilma Rousseff of Brazil
(2011-2016), who rose to prominence within the Da Silva administration, falls along similar
lines. Both aligned themselves closely with Hugo Chávez within the realm of regional politics.
However, by the time Venezuela was officially suspended in 2017, both heads of state
had been replaced. Rousseff was removed from office in 2016, giving way for her vice president,
Michel Temer, who served until the expiration of her allotted term in 2018. Kirchner’s party was
defeated in Argentina’s 2015 elections, and the presidency was won by Mauricio Macri (20152019). Macri’s Cambiemos is a centrist, anti-Peronist party which would represent a reversal of
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the populist dogma.97 The loss of key political allies within Mercosur means that the brand of
left-wing populism embraced by the chavistas would not protect them from institutional
repercussions. The hard assumption that Mercosur will not act decisively against a left-wing
leader does not hold, and so 𝐻 does not seem particularly applicable given alternative
explanations.
𝐻 : Severity
It is notable that this case represents a threat to democracy which is instigated by an
incumbent, rather than an outside actor. Under the framework developed by Smith, any response
to such executive aggrandizement would be mitigated by the principle of ‘executive
sovereignty’.98 Interestingly, Smith herself classifies the events in Venezuela from 2014 to 2016
as a low-severity crisis.99 This is in spite of multiple events which would seem to fulfill the
conditions of a self-coup, such as refusal to hold a recall election and the stripping of
constitutional authority (via Supreme Court ruling) from the legislature. This work takes a
contrary stance, bearing in mind the benchmark test of whether constitutional rules are violated
or subverted. The complete erosion of legislative authority within Venezuela, brought on by two
successive presidents and enabled by a captive judiciary, represents a profound subversion of the
constitutional order. The various branches of government have been rendered incapable of
functioning as a unit. In 2019, an essentially powerless National Assembly swore in Juan Guaidó
as the acting president of the country, a claim which lacks effective legal and diplomatic force.
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The implications of this crisis for the overall rule of law within Venezuela contribute to
its classification here as a high-severity event. In Betsy Smith’s framework, the shield of
executive sovereignty which might be claimed by Chávez or Maduro would likely be rendered
invalid in the eyes of the other Mercosur states due to this severity. Another perspective would
hold that the violence wrought by Venezuela’s constitutional crisis, as described by Legler, is
what defines its severity. 2016 marks a turning point in which the Venezuelan government had
increasingly resorted to aggressive repression of dissidents. 100 This fact alone may have
contributed to Mercosur’s sudden urgency to act against the Maduro regime. 𝐻 would predict at
the very least a direct intervention by Mercosur’s foreign ministers or ambassadors. The outright
suspension which occurred is seen as consistent with the hypothesis as well.
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Case Study #5: Brazil 2016
This case examines the impeachment and subsequent removal of Brazilian president
Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). Brazil’s constitution allows for the impeachment of a President in
cases of crimes de responsabilidade, or ‘crimes of responsibility.’ This includes violations of
constitutional or other legal provisions relating to security, budget, the separation of powers, or
other such integral state interests.101 In this case, the impeachment arose from allegations that the
Rousseff government engaged in what has been termed “creative accounting” to disguise certain
debts within the federal budget.102 This involves requesting funds from state-owned financial
institutions, such as the Banco do Brasil, and reporting these as expenditures already covered for
the purpose of funding key social programs. In this situation, it would be more accurate to report
these funds as debts which are owed to the financial institutions, but such a budget item would be
subject to greater legislative review and scrutiny. Creative accounting measures like this have the
effect of downplaying the nation’s debt and creating an impression of greater macroeconomic
stability. The allegations of unauthorized borrowing led to Rousseff’s impeachment under the
federal Fiscal Responsibility Law, under which the issue of debt must be subject to congressional
review. Large irregularities were discovered in in the budget shortly after Rousseff’s re-election
in 2014, and a Senate investigation placed the amount at more than R$50 billion.
While Brazil’s legislature had its own particular basis for impeachment, the court of
public opinion was swayed by other events occurring around the same time. At the forefront
were the corruption allegations surrounding Petrobras, Brazil’s state oil enterprise. An
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investigation, now known as “Operation Car Wash,” originally began with concerns over smallscale money laundering. Eventually it was discovered that Petrobras executives spent large sums
on bloated contracts. Rousseff, along with her predecessor, “Lula” da Silva, were implicated in
the scandal as members of the board of Petrobras. 103
Economic trends may have also added fuel to the fire. Rousseff was first elected during a
period of significant economic growth in Brazil – around 4 to 5 percent annually beginning in
2000.104 Marcus André Melo sets her impeachment against a growing dissatisfaction as this trend
began to reverse in 2013. Brazil had previously been cited as a strong example of the “left turn
done right,” as Rousseff’s Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) was attributed for the nation’s
widespread and inclusive development. When GDP growth eventually leveled out, Rousseff
attempted to stop the bleeding by instituting capital controls and austerity measures which met
with sharp disapproval. Given this context, Melo seems to suggest that the Petrobras corruption
allegations which surfaced in 2013 were simply the last straw in a series of political mishaps. 105
Rousseff referred to the impeachment process as a “parliamentary coup.” Some have
emphasized the highly political nature of the impeachment and subsequent trial. This is well
signified by the way some Brazilian senators announced their intended vote before a defense had
even been presented. Such political displays led Leonardo Avritzer to characterize the
impeachment as “an illegal recall of the presidential mandate” with “almost no legal ground.” 106
This was disputed by opposition members, who maintained their adherence to constitutional
protocols. Indeed, the view of impeachment as a purely political process must be reconciled with
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the legal bases of the case. Even members of the opposition conceded at times that impeachment,
while a popular proposition, may not be particularly well-supported by the material facts. 107
Nonetheless, impeachment and removal are tools by which a legislature may subvert an
executive, and public opinion was certainly on the side of the opposition in this case.
The impeachment process began with a motion passed in December of 2015. Unlike the
Lugo impeachment, which was concluded in a matter of days, the proceedings against Rousseff
took place over the course of half a year. The lower house of Brazil’s legislature voted to begin a
formal trial in April of 2016. In late August, the Senate voted 61-20 to remove Rousseff from
office, replacing her with Vice President Michel Temer (2016-2018). 108

Response of Mercosur
Alexandre Sam Martin Portes draws a contrast between these events and those in
Paraguay in 2012, specifically with respect to Mercosur’s response. The outlook of each member
state varied to a certain degree. The governments of Argentina and Paraguay accepted the
outcome of Brazil’s domestic processes, while Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela was critical. Portes
notes no particular response from Uruguay. 109 Ultimately, Mercosur did not take a position on
the matter. Clearly there was implicit trust in Brazil’s impeachment process throughout most of
the Mercosur’s leadership, but the complete lack of even a publicized statement from the
institution marks this is a particularly weak response.
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Case Analysis
𝐻 : Brazilian Hegemony
Since 𝐻 focuses on the Brazilian state’s hegemonic interests within the context of
international relations, its terms and underlying logic are not applicable in the same way as in
other cases. All other cases have examined crises taking place in other countries, so there could
have been some discussion of whether the Brazilian administration has some sort of powerenhancing interest in democracy protection. Here, such international political considerations are
superseded by domestic ones. The corruption scandal facing the president was too significant to
ignore, and a whole two-thirds of Brazilians supported Rousseff’s impeachment. 110 𝐻 proposes
that a response to a democratic crisis will be stronger if Brazil has a clear strategic interest in it;
the most that can be said here is that no such interest exists, so a weak response would be
predicted.
𝐻 : Regional Norms
As the events in Brazil took place in the same year as Mercosur’s initial sanctioning of
Venezuela, the Freedom House data will be the same as in Figure 4 above. The conditions
highlighted in the Freedom in the World report are also the same as what was briefly discussed
in the previous case study. However, it is worth repeating that Brazil experienced a significant
strengthening of its economic fundamentals and political institutions beginning around the turn
of the 21st century.
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Figure 5: Comparison of Freedom in the World Ratings of Mercosur States, 2013 & 2017
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Frances Hagopian offers the optimistic perspective that Brazilian democracy had been
greatly strengthened since Collor de Mello’s impeachment in 1992. She suggests that during this
period, enhanced civic participation and “horizontal accountability” in Brazil’s government went
hand-in-hand with its effective redistributive economic policies. 111 This was followed by
stagnation in 2013, as well as the political drama surrounding Petrobras. Such events doubtlessly
contributed to an erosion in public confidence (although in the eyes of many, Rousseff’s ouster
was a fulfillment of popular will). Such erosion would not necessarily be reflected by Freedom
House’s final observations in political rights and civil liberties in Brazil.
Mercosur’s commitment to specific rules or measures of democratic governance remains
an issue. There is the Ushuaia Protocol, but this document speaks of democratic principles in the
general sense and does not provide its signatories with any explicit markers of deterioration to
seek out.112 As mentioned with respect to 𝐻 , Brazil should have no interest in invoking such an
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international agreement when it would directly contravene its domestic processes. And at the
same time, its neighbors would struggle to justify any sort of intervention. In this case the desire
for political stability throughout Mercosur must be balanced with the Brazilian legislature’s
application of impeachment as a constitutionally prescribed procedure.
On balance, the Freedom in the World data shows an organization consisting mostly of
‘Free’ democratic societies. 𝐻 would likely predict that those same actors that sanctioned
Venezuela for betraying its democratic commitment would at the very least release a statement
on the situation in Brazil. Therefore, the complete lack of response seen here does not meet the
expectation.

𝐻 : Ideology
As mentioned previously, the only regional actor to echo Rousseff’s protests was Nicolas
Maduro of Venezuela. This is understandable given the affinity developed through the ‘Pink
Tide’ which brought the PSUV and the PT to power in Venezuela and Brazil, respectively.
Meanwhile, the ideological bond between Brazil and Argentina was not as strong in 2016 as it
once had been. Pedro Paulo Zahluth Bastos and Célio Hiratuka take the position that Argentina,
and even the kirchneristas who were once allies of the Da Silva government, were increasingly
alienated by Rousseff’s capital-friendly policies. Brazil’s affinity for capital investments from
developed nations during her tenure may have contributed to a reduction in competitiveness for
Argentine enterprises.113 Such a causation, as well as the entrance of center-right president
Mauricio Macri in 2015, may help to explain Argentina’s lack of enthusiasm for a possible
Mercosur response. There was a government in Uruguay which has been identified as center-left,
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under the leadership of the Broad Front’s Tabaré Vázquez. 114 However, the lack of opposition to
the impeachment from both him and Paraguay’s Colorado Party leadership is noted. 𝐻 seems to
be supported insofar as there is a lack of ideological allies who might come to Rousseff’s
defense.

𝐻 : Severity
The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff represents the same sort of ‘interrupted presidency’
which affected Fernando Lugo in 2012. Mercosur’s nonexistent response to the Brazilian case is
a clear contrast to the suspension which was issued against Paraguay. However, there are factors
which serve to mitigate the perceived severity of this event. The impeachment process in Brazil
appears, at least on the surface, much more measured and deliberative, taking place over the
course of more than six months. Both the Lugo and Rousseff impeachments were
constitutionally permissible, at least in theory. And given the Petrobras scandal, set against a
backdrop of emerging economic stagnation, it would have been difficult for Rousseff to avoid
this sort of scrutiny. This is decidedly a low-severity event; the legislature and judiciary
performed their functions as prescribed by the constitution, even if individual motivations may
have been in doubt. And while there were widespread protests against Rousseff’s government,
outright violence was limited at most, and could not be attributed directly to the state.
Although the democratic crisis facing Brazil may not have been severe within the given
framework, the complete lack of a response from Mercosur is surprising given Rousseff’s status
as an elected incumbent. 𝐻 might predict that she would enjoy certain privileges in the eyes of
the international community, and that Brazil’s Mercosur partners would issue a declaration of

114

Décima, Juan. “Cambio de gobierno: El Frente Amplio deja el poder y se prepara para una nueva etapa en
Uruguay.”

58

some sort. However, the fact that there was little to no response at all from the Mercosur
community is still consistent with the overall low severity of the events.

59

Discussion
This work includes five case studies of political events from throughout the history of
Mercosur. From outright lapses in the democratic order (or the threat thereof) to interruptions in
executive power which generate some degree of controversy, these various episodes highlight an
array of different approaches taken by the bloc in each case. Figure 6 summarizes the outcomes
of each case examined here, with respect to enforcement by Mercosur.
Figure 6: Summary of Mercosur Responses
Case
Description
Paraguay 1996
Direct diplomatic engagement,
particularly from Brazil; statements of
support, condemnation of Oviedo
Argentina 2001
Statements of support; forbearance of
institutional customs obligations
Paraguay 2012
Suspension pending the 2013
presidential election
Venezuela 2013None; full accession to the bloc
2015
granted in 2013
Venezuela 2016Indefinite suspension under the
2017
Ushuaia Protocol; some commercial
provisions remain in effect
Brazil 2016
None at the institutional level

Classification of response
Strong

Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong

Weak

In an attempt to better ascertain the conditions which provide for stronger enforcement,
the cases have been sorted into two separate figures. Each figure summarizes each episode in
terms of the criteria which were used to evaluate this work’s various hypotheses. The first
column assesses whether the Brazilian administration at the time holds a specific foreign policy
interest which would be furthered by strong enforcement of the democracy clause, as outlined in
the case studies. The second is based on whether or not a majority of Mercosur members are
ranked as “Free” in terms of Freedom House metrics, which here serves as a marker of their
overall commitment to democratic norms. The third column applies where more than one head of
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state within Mercosur, including the subject of a crisis, can be identified with the greater ‘New
Left’ movement. The fourth column combines two different aspects of a crisis: severity and
target. Here, the two factors go hand-in-hand because a threat against an elected incumbent is
generally seen as a more obvious marker of constitutional erosion. In the following figures, a
threat against an incumbent will be denoted by a ‘+,’ while a threat from an incumbent will be
denoted by ‘-.’ Figure 7 shows the cases in which little to no response was observed from
Mercosur. Figure 8 details the stronger responses, which here range from diplomatic
intervention to suspension.
Figure 7: Cases with Weak Mercosur Response
Brazilian strategic
Strong
interest in
democratic
enforcement?
norms?
Argentina
Yes
No
2001
Venezuela
No
Yes
2013-2015
Brazil 2016
N/A
Yes
Figure 8: Cases with Strong Mercosur Response
Brazilian strategic
Strong
interest in
democratic
enforcement?
norms?
Paraguay
Intermediate
No
1996
Paraguay
Yes
Yes
2012
Venezuela
Yes
Yes
2016-2017

Coalition of the
left?

Severe crisis?

No

No +

Yes

Yes -

No

No +

Coalition of the
left?

Severe crisis?

No

Yes +

Yes

No +

No

Yes -

Analysis
What will follow is a more detailed overview and evaluation of each hypothesis, with
respect to the facts of each case study. The hope is that this, together with the overview above,
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will provide insight regarding the conditions under which Mercosur best works toward
democracy protection within its member countries.
Hypothesis #1: Hegemonic Interests. There is a compelling case to be made for the role
of Brazilian interests in enforcement outcomes. More aggressive enforcement does seem to align
with specific strategic objectives. In 1996, the Brazilian ambassador was decisive in his support
for Juan Carlos Wasmosy, suggesting that the Brazilian administration was more willing than
most to assist in securing a peaceful resolution. The suspensions of both Paraguay and Venezuela
serve ideological ends for the Brazilian administrations under which they occur. This serves to
strengthen the realist hypothesis while also lending support to Hypothesis #3.
Specific Brazilian interests (or a lack thereof) also explain two of the cases in which there
was little to no response from Mercosur. The Rousseff administration turned a blind eye as
violent protests erupted in Venezuela. This is most likely because the desire to enhance ties with
the Maduro regime had overwritten any interest in democracy protection as an end unto itself.
Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016 is a domestic political matter, and so there is no specific
interest in the international sense. Argentina’s economic crisis is the case which challenges this
hypothesis the most, as Mercosur took no action despite Brazil’s interest in stabilizing their
largest regional trade partner. This is perhaps the one case which necessarily begs an alternative
explanation; Mercosur’s lack of response is perhaps better predicted by the low severity of the
threat to Argentina’s constitution, and its legislature’s relatively apt handling of the political
crisis.
Hypothesis #2: Democratic Norms. When examining the full array of cases, prior
democratic commitment seems a less compelling explanatory mechanism, at least in the way it is
measured here. While Freedom House observes that Mercosur’s member states are generally

62

becoming freer and more democratic with time, this does not correspond with the organization’s
crisis outcomes. Notably, the steady consolidation of freedoms which they observe in their
annual reports did not preclude them from inviting a decidedly less democratic Venezuela. In
this case the lack of specific criteria for assessing the state of democracy becomes clear. This
problem is summarized by Alexandre Sam Martin Portes’s poignant criticism of Mercosur’s
democracy clause: “The nonexistence of precise definitions for ‘rupture in the democratic order’
is a defect of this regime. Since Mercosur itself does not define democratic order, it is hard to
expect a consistent behavior from its members. A consensus among the members is difficult
when each should find a definition of democracy and rupture.” 115 While the Ushuaia Protocol
was invoked in Mercosur’s suspensions of both Paraguay and Venezuela, this was not in
accordance with any specific diagnostics. Normative explanations do not suffice across the
various case studies, so one must look elsewhere to see why Mercosur acts in the manner that it
does.
Hypothesis #3: Ideology. Regardless of what Mercosur’s particular motivations may be
for intervention or non-intervention, there is a compelling story to be found in its lack of
consistency. Its members have at certain points allowed corrupt and abusive practices to occur.
Their complacency regarding Venezuela is the best example of this. While the bloc’s members
have made great strides toward building stable democracies, both individually and as a
collective, the concept of democracy protection as an end unto itself undoubtedly remains in
question. Still, ideological factors can also explain Mercosur’s eventual move toward suspending
Venezuela. By 2016, changes of government in both Brazil and Argentina signal an erosion of
the ‘New Left’ movement which had provided the Venezuelan heads of state with more like-
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minded counterparts. The loss of left-wing allies within Mercosur likely triggered a reorientation
of executive-level dialogue around democratic and human rights abuses, placing into focus the
delinquency of the Chávez and Maduro governments with the terms of the Ushuaia Protocol.
The shift in attitudes toward Venezuela lends crucial support to the ideology hypothesis.
In Figures 7 and 8, the practically ongoing Venezuelan crisis is divided into two episodes; 2017
is a culmination of sorts with the country’s suspension from Mercosur. Figure 9 further
highlights the varied circumstances which existed at the beginning and end of Venezuela’s
membership.
Figure 9: Summary of Mercosur Responses to Venezuela Crisis
Time period
Brazilian strategic
Strong
Coalition of
interest in
democratic
the left?
enforcement?
norms?
2013-2015
No
Yes
Yes
2016-2017
Yes
Yes
No

Severe
crisis?

Mercosur
Response

Yes Yes -

Weak
Strong

2016 marks a clear turning point where discussions of enforcement begin among
Maduro’s Mercosur counterparts. The case study establishes that Venezuelan democracy had
been locked in a steady decline since the rise of the PSUV government. A substantial erosion of
legislative power, along with persistent corruption concerns, did not prevent Venezuela from
acceding to Mercosur in the first place. The other four members of Mercosur may have been
compelled to act after the events of 2014, when protests against the incumbent regime began to
be characterized by increasingly violent clashes.
Ideology may also explain Mercosur’s heavy-handed response to the ouster of Fernando
Lugo in Paraguay. Lugo’s opposition to the dominant Colorado Party generated strong synergies
with the likes of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Dilma Rousseff. The removal of an
executive through constitutionally sanctioned procedures will not necessarily be met with such a
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strong response as suspension, but the outcome makes more sense given the desire to protect a
like-minded political figure. Still, there are other cases examined in this work where the ideology
hypothesis, as it is developed here, is far less applicable. The ‘New Left’ as it is commonly
known had not yet emerged by the turn of the century. Despite this, when a military strongman
threatened Paraguay’s nascent democracy, Mercosur was cited as a decisive force in backing
President Wasmosy. The ideological factor is also absent when Argentina resolves the political
repercussions of its economic crisis.
Hypothesis #4: Source and Severity. It can be observed here that Mercosur tends to react
strongly to the most egregious violations of a domestic constitutional order, regardless of their
source. There is some support for the idea that an interruption of an executive’s term should
draw the bloc’s attention. However, the contrast between the impeachments of Lugo and
Rousseff seems to imply that there is some minimal expectation of what constitutes a lawful
interruption. It may seem intuitive that a removal from office which is deliberated over merely
three days will draw more scrutiny than one which is organized over many months. Still, there is
no specific standard of constitutional severity which explains the difference in outcomes.
The 2001-2002 crisis in Argentina was accompanied by widespread demonstrations and
even instances of violence and death among civilians. However, these protests were not aimed at
any one political figure, but rather a broader establishment of both domestic institutions and
international organizations which had contributed to the economic depression. Both the
Argentina and Brazil cases involve instances of executive turnover; the lack of significant
response by Mercosur may be explained in part by the fact that, at least on the surface, the
constitutional order continued to function as intended. Simply put, the government of each
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respective country had been able to resolve the political crisis while respecting constitutional
processes, so there was no need for a supranational body to intervene.
If the standards applied during the 1996 Paraguayan crisis still hold, one can expect the
Mercosur to act decisively against any threat coming from an actor outside government, such as
the military. This is a positive sign, especially given the historical impulses that led to
Mercosur’s creation. But while military coups are decidedly less common, there exist other
forms of constitutional erosion which Mercosur is less prepared to act upon. This includes “selfcoups,” or attempts by the executive to secure more power than is afforded under the
constitutional order. These may be more difficult to recognize because they often occur
incrementally,116 and may be carried out under the guise of popular sovereignty. The executive
aggrandizement under Venezuela’s PSUV government has brought widespread suppression of
political opposition, which is typically characteristic of authoritarian juntas, and for a time there
was little to no response from Mercosur. While certain types of crises are difficult to turn away
from, it would seem that severity alone does not explain outcomes within Mercosur.

This analysis may be used to synthesize some concluding remarks on the outcomes for
each hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 is rejected in the context of this work, as existing democratic
norms do not provide particularly comprehensive predictions for how Mercosur will respond to a
crisis. While all its members have made great strides individually toward consolidating
democratic institutions and behaviors, their collective democracy protection initiatives are
inhibited by a continued lack of specific criteria and robust precedent. Hypothesis 3 also is not
well supported, mainly because the factor of political ideology is only clearly relevant in the
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South American context for a limited period of time. The two earliest cases examined in this
work do not have a clear ideological dimension. The emergence of transnational popular
movements tell a unique story, and it may still be fair to conclude that Mercosur as an institution
acts more decisively with ideological convergence. However, reluctance to act against a political
ally – and willingness to punish political others – hardly implies that democracy protection
initiatives will be more successful. Hypothesis 4 suffers its own unique failures, as the severity
of a crisis is not always perceived similarly by all relevant parties. Clearly, Mercosur recognizes
the most egregious violations of constitutional order, but this does not mean that it will act on all
violations, nor that the harshest punitive measures are reserved for such violations.
Hypothesis 1 remains the most consistently supported hypothesis across all of the various
case studies. Here, Brazilian strategic interest has been interpreted broadly, and could include
commercial, diplomatic, and even ideological calculations. Where a specific interest along such
lines can be identified, the response to a crisis tends to be stronger. Thus, it is observed that
Mercosur works most effectively toward democracy protection when Brazil, its largest member,
takes interest in enforcement.

Alternative Explanations
One recurring theme which might be explored further is the extent to which Mercosur
abides by the will of the domestic public. In the case of Paraguay in 1996, Wasmosy was buoyed
by overwhelming public support in the face of General Oviedo’s threats. The converse is true for
the Brazilian case, in which Rousseff’s approval ratings had plummeted and the impeachment
proceedings against her had widespread support. Fernando Lugo, while relatively popular
throughout his term, suffered from such incidents as the land reform protest which preceded his
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impeachment in 2012. In any case, it makes logical sense that Mercosur would not act wholly
against the will of any public. Further work might focus on the extent to which domestic political
pressures interact with hegemonic interests, such as if a more powerful state like Brazil might be
compelled to act through Mercosur’s enforcement mechanisms if enough popular supportexisted
in another member state.

Policy Implications
Should the Mercosur desire more consistency in its behavior moving forward, it might
start by addressing the concerns raised by Portes. Instead of alluding to ‘democratic
commitments’ broadly, it could set minimal standards of good constitutional functioning, and
identify specific violations upon which the bloc might act. But at the same time, his criticism
cuts to the heart of why institutional normativism often fails in practice: sovereign states tend to
avoid imposing rules on themselves as much as they can, even if the rules might seem like
common sense. For example, domestic politicians can be expected to oppose guidelines which
limit their ability to impeach and remove an executive. This power is held as a key check in most
democratic systems (if not all).
Still, Mercosur’s varied and inconsistent response to the Venezuela crisis stands out as a
worthy subject of further research in its own right. Mercosur’s decision to engage with this
nondemocratic regime in the first place may be puzzling, and its eventual intervention does not
seem to have rendered any significant positive impact at present.
Recent reporting on Mercosur paints a gloomy picture for the bloc’s future. In a piece
published in World Politics Review, Bruno Binetti observes that recent economic downturns
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within its member states have been exacerbated by their customs and trade obligations. 117
Argentina and Brazil have been at odds over external tariffs; the latter has sought a reduction,
while the former has moved to product domestic industries amidst a profound monetary crisis.
Binetti opines that a lack of unified economic development strategies has rendered Mercosur
ineffectual, a sharp contrast from the initial spirit of harmonization and democratization that
allowed integration to proceed in 1991.
One compelling explanation for the variations in Mercosur’s democracy defense
initiatives is that the bloc serves as an extension of hegemonic self-interest, acting when a
stronger state wishes to influence the weaker ones’ behaviors. The bloc is also not immune to
political and economic impulses among its members. Political conditions are vastly different in
each individual state, and can affect the willingness to meaningfully engage with regional
institutions to begin with. It is established here that the tide of left-wing populism had a decisive
impact on Mercosur’s democracy protection outcomes during the 2010s. Other transnational
phenomena, such as the current proliferation of right-wing nationalist movements, could
similarly affect outlooks for regionalism. Differences in economic fundamentals are also a
persistent problem; Brazil and Paraguay may never agree completely on customs issues due to
the vastly different scales of their economies. Such a lopsided dynamic has affected relations
within Mercosur since its founding. Nonetheless, this does not preclude some positive outcomes.
Further experience and research will likely paint Mercosur as an emerging entrepreneur of
democratic norms, at least in principle, in addition to the commercial benefits which it confers
upon its members.
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